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The Courts in National Security Policy
By: Liam Kerr, Gettysburg College
Abstract

Presidential authority in the realm of national
security policy has increased since George Washington’s administration. The most noticeable expansion
of America’s position in global hegemon followed
the allied victory in World War II. Accompanying the
rapid increase in the Executive Branch’s authority
has been deference from the traditional constraints
on the President’s power, namely Congress and public
opinion. This paper seeks to answer the question of
whether the Judicial Branch, specifically the Supreme
Court, has acted overall to constrain or enable the expansion of presidential war powers. This question will
be examined through a qualitative analysis of existing
academic literature and Supreme Court opinions.
Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the Executive
Branch of the United States government has expanded
its scope of power. The rise of American global hegemony was further solidified with the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Presidents since George Washington
have taken executive actions, which challenged contemporary understandings of the proper role of the
office. The Founding Fathers disagreed greatly about
the “war powers” of the presidency, evidenced in the
Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and other foundational writings of the American democratic philosophy. Writing to fellow founder of the Democratic-Republican Party, James Madison opined to Thomas
Jefferson that “The constitution supposes, what the
History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the
branch of power most interested in war, & most prone
to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the
question of war in the Legisl.”1 On the opposite end
of the spectrum was Federalist Alexander Hamilton, a
staunch advocate for presidential power according to
the English model. Hamilton surmised that the president held significant authority “In the conduct of war,
in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark

of the national security.”2 As the following paper will
illustrate, the debate between American policymakers
regarding the primacy of the Executive Branch has
flourished from the founding of the nation to the war
on terrorism.
Jordan, Taylor, Meese, & Nielson (2009) discussed whether there are effective checks on presidential powers and which actors in the policymaking process are most impactful on the distribution of national
security authority. They concluded that, in addition
to the tensions between the president and Congress,
other influential actors include “public opinion, interest groups, the impact of past policies and programs,
the responsiveness of the executive bureaucracy, and
the views, interests, and expected reactions of other
nations.”3 Conspicuously excluded from the list is the
Judicial Branch of the US government. This paper will
seek to analyze the impact of the courts on US national security policymaking, focusing more specifically
on the effect of Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decisions
and jurisprudence on legal attitudes and interpretations. In particular, the research presented seeks to
answer whether the Supreme Court has enabled or
limited the operations of executive policy-making in
national security-related issues. Given the national
attention drawn to several landmark decisions, such
as Nixon v. U.S. (discussed later), it is theorized that
the following research will demonstrate that SCOTUS
acted as a significant overall constraint on constantly
expanding presidential powers.
The Arguments: Jurisprudence and Precedent
The aforementioned debate between America’s
greatest political philosophers during the time of the
nation’s founding laid the groundwork for centuries of
legal argumentation. Constitutional legal experts have
debated the question of presidential war powers from
the beginning of our republic on issues such as George
Washington’s suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion,
Thomas Jefferson’s deployment of Marines to the

1 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 2, 1798, in The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/a 1_8_11s8.html.
2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70, in The Federalist,
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-70
3 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielson, American National Security. 6th ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009), 97.
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Barbary Coast, James Polk’s instigations with Mexico
and Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus
rights. The legal arguments surrounding expansionary
versus limited war powers parallel broader debates
between strict and loose constitutional interpretation.
James Baker, a notable public servant under several
Republican administrations, struck at the importance
of constitutional interpretation when he said, “As the
president’s national security lawyer, I was initially
surprised how often my legal analysis started and often ended, with the text of the Constitution.”4 National
security decisions require legal analysis. The following discussion on legal precedent and interpretation
will provide the proper backdrop for an analysis of
SCOTUS’ impact on national security policy.
There are several notable 19th-century examples of judicial review and subsequent constraint of
presidential power by the courts. One such example is
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex Parte Merryman,
where he condemns Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas
Corpus: a power expressly granted to the Legislative
Branch.5 Most modern legal experts, however, tend
to focus on a handful of 20th and 21st-century cases
when determining executive powers in national security policy. Baker outlines the two cases which represent
the two opposing ends of the spectrum of debate.
The first such case is that of U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) in which Justice
Sutherland wrote the court’s majority opinion. The
issue at hand was whether Congress had the ability
to delegate to the President power to restrict weapon
exports to the parties of the Chaco War. In his opinion,
Sutherland concluded that the President is the “sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations- a power which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress” and therefore, he, “not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing conditions which prevail in foreign countries
and especially in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information....”6 Sutherland further added
an unprecedented allotment of authority to the execu-

tive by stating “external sovereignty” exists above the
confines of the Constitution, inherent to the Union and
leaving the President, as the sole organ of international
relations, with almost limitless power in national security.7
As influential as the Curtiss-Wright decision
was in national security jurisprudence, another case
stands as a more prominent precedent in constitutional
law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer (1952)
saw a legal challenge to President Truman’s decision
to nationalize the steel industry in order to prevent
a potential national security crisis resulting from
a national steelworker strike. Although there were
many significant concurring and dissenting opinions
which are all referenced by lawyers today, it is Justice
Black’s majority opinion and Justice Frankfurter’s
concurring opinion which have proven most impactful. Black argued that, “Even though ‘theater of war’
be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness
to our constitutional system hold that [the President]
has the ultimate power to take possession of private
property.”8 Because this was concerned with domestic
powers, it is possible such an assertion is still consistent with Justice Sutherland’s Curtiss-Wright opinion.
Ironically, this case is more widely referenced to justify expanding presidential powers due to what Justice
Frankfurter called the executive “gloss” of presidential
authority. He states that presidential war powers are
justified by “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution.”9 The
Youngstown case stands as the preeminent backdrop to
cases pertaining to executive national security actions.
Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright demonstrate
the vast differences in Supreme Court decisions.
These cases, however, are not the only examples.
Chris Edelson discusses the infamous Korematsu v.
United States, in which Justice Stone led the court in
answering “whether, acting in cooperation, Congress
and the Executive have constitutional authority to

4 James E. Baker, In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 33.
5 Bruce A. Ragsdale, Ex Parte Merryman, and Debates on Civil Liberties During the Civil War. Federal Judicial Center. Federal Judicial Center
History Office. 2007.
6 Baker, 39.
7 “United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).” Justia Law. Accessed April 17, 2018.
8 Baker, 41.
9 “Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).” Justia Law. Accessed April 17, 2018.
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impose the curfew restrictions here complained of.”10
Mirroring language used in the Curtiss-Wright majority opinion and Justice Franklin’s concurring opinion
in Youngstown, Justice Stone concluded that, “the
two branches, acting together, possess the complete
war power of the national government.”11 Therefore,
since Congress permitted President Roosevelt to force
Japanese-Americans into internment camps during
a time of emergency, the action was constitutionally
acceptable. It should be pointed out, for reference
later in this paper, that Justice Franklin noted in his
Youngstown concurrence that “no such cooperation
between Congress and the President existed and therefore the action was unconstitutional.”
The ageless debate between expansionary and
limited presidential ascendancy in national security
powers thrived within the walls of the Supreme Court
since the founding of the nation. These three 20th century cases often provided the foundational context for
further interpretation of the president’s delegated and
implied war powers. The question then becomes, has
the Supreme Court significantly limited or enabled the
expansion of executive power which has taken place,
especially since the end of WWII? Scholars disagree
regarding this question, but this paper will organize
historical examples corroborating both sides of the
academic debate into a framework that explains why
differences in historical jurisprudence exist.
The Case for Activism
Those who believe the presidency has been
hindered in its pursuit of greater power by the Supreme Court follow the pattern of analyzing cases
from the 20th and 21st centuries. Christenson and Kriner examine recent examples relating to the unprecedented levels of presidential imperium during the presidency of George W. Bush and his war on terrorism.
Their take on the effectiveness of the courts’ reining
in of presidents stems from the notion that, “For most
of American history, the courts rationally shied away

from direct confrontations with the executive branch
(Fisher 2005). Even some of the rare presidential defeats, such as the landmark ruling in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), may have paradoxically
bolstered presidential power in the long term (Silverstein 1997; Bellia 2002).”12 Despite this historical
deference, Christenson and Kriner come to the conclusion that the Supreme Court has increasingly asserted
its authority to decide when the executive branch has
overstepped its supposed mandate in national security
policy-making.
Three cases are cited by Christenson and
Kriner as evidence of the trend of increasing judicial
activism. In the 2004 case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
court ruled that “The administration could not hold
American citizens as enemy combatants and deny
them due process and habeas corpus rights.”13 Justice
O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, asserting that
a state of war does not grant “a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”14 Just two years later, the court ruled in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the military tribunals created
by the President were unconstitutional. Justice Stevens
continued by saying the defendant’s argument that
“federal courts should respect the balance Congress
struck when it created ‘an integrated system of military courts and review procedures’ is inapposite since
the tribunal convened to try Hamdan is not part of that
integrated system.”15 In this decision, the court echoes
earlier notions that legislative assent to executive action lends greater levels of legitimacy to the executive
branch’s national security policy. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush (2008) that
Guantanamo prisoners were entitled to vie for habeas
corpus rights. Roger Douglas notes that although there
existed an acknowledged “right to detain,” that right
“did not necessarily mean a right to detain unfettered
by judicial accountability.”16
Two notable cases arose during the administration of President Richard Nixon which Edelson

10 Chris. Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power from the Drafting of the Constitution to the
War on Terror. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013.
11 Ibid., 85.
12 Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner, “The Specter of Supreme Court Criticism: Public Opinion and Unilateral Action.” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2017): 471-494.
13 Ibid.
14 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004)
15 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 (2006)
16 Roger Douglas, Law, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 174.
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considers equally as prominent in case law. The first is
New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), in which
Justice Black declared that Nixon overstepped his
authority by censoring publication of the leaked Pentagon Papers, which revealed government knowledge of
the impossibility of winning the Vietnam War. Black
opined, “In revealing the workings of government
that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did
precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted
they would do.”17 Noticeably, President Nixon acted
without the authorization of Congress and therefore
lacked the clout enjoyed by President Roosevelt in
Curtiss-Wright. Another case involving President Nixon was the more popularly acclaimed case of United
States v. Nixon (1974) which related to the President’s
claim of executive authority in releasing audio recordings of conversations had in the Oval Office. Although
this case does not deal with national security issues,
the President still claimed that executive privilege derived from concerns over national security information
which would be dangerous to release. Justice Burger
led the unanimous court in reaffirming that “it is the
province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’
with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this
case [Marbury v. Madison]....”18
Edelson, Christenson, Kriner, and Douglas all
share the belief that the Supreme Court has significantly constrained the presidency on many issues which
are presented to them. While they recognize that the
Supreme Court has at other times enhanced presidential authority, they argue that the general trend is an
increase of judicial activism as the Executive Branch
has grown in size and scope. This stance is followed
by the opposite argument: that the Supreme Court has,
on the whole, acted to enable the president’s enhancement of power through deference, save a few isolated
examples to the contrary.
The Case for Deference
Conventional academic teaching emphasizes the
role of the courts in having authority on the meaning

and proper application of the law in relation to the
Constitution and existing case law. What if, however,
the President and Congress actually share the responsibility of interpreting the law and the Constitution?
Robert Blomquist and other advocates for presidential unilateralism argue that, as constitutional entities
with delegated powers, the Executive and Legislative Branches possess the ability to define their roles
under the Constitution. Focusing on this power, called
‘presiprudence,’ Blomquist perceives the presidency
as “the American national security sentinel based on a
broad - but not unlimited - interpretation of presidential power.”19 A familiar argument to constitutional
lawyers, such a theory is based heavily on a recurrent assessment of presidential power known as the
“sole organ” doctrine, drawn from a speech by John
Marshall in 1800.20 The sole organ doctrine, which
was cited as justification in the aforementioned Curtiss-Wright decision, has been used to substantiate the
notion that the executive is empowered as the primary
actor in foreign relations.
Blomquist relies on the sole organ doctrine
in defining the concept of presiprudence, a term he
coined, which has been an assertion made by advocates of presidential power since Alexander Hamilton. It is ironic that the doctrine was conceived by
the mastermind of judicial review, particularly since
Blomquist uses the doctrine in subjecting presidential
action in national security policy to simply “reasonably deferential judicial review.” As the frequent and
natural foil to Federalist rhetoric, James
Madison provided his input on Hamilton and Marshall’s pronouncement of executive authority when he
said “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the
nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a
war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.”21 Madison’s school won in the infamous case U.S.
v. Nixon, in which the court asserted its sole authority
to interpret the law. Blomquist repeats the frequent
concept that “privileging the president’s perspective on national security needs carefully balanced by

17 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
18 United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974)
19 Robert F. Blomquist, “The Theoretical Constitutional Shape (And Shaping) of American National Security Law.” St. Louis University Public
Law Review 31, no. 1 (2011): 439-473.
20 Fisher, Louis. “The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 2007): 13952.
21 James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, nos. 1-4. 24 Aug. - 14 Sept. 1793, in The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt.
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Congress’ perspective.”22 Yet again, judicial review of
presidential action seems to hinge on whether
Congress has granted unilateral presidential dominion
over an issue.
Several other scholars have spoken on this topic to reinforce the sentiment that courts have conceded
significant authority to the presidency. Gregory McNeal wrote an extended review of an academic book
entitled In the Age of Deference, by David Rudenstine.
Emphasized in the review is an assessment of the
classic dichotomy between liberty and security, most
famously alluded to by Benjamin Franklin. “Rudenstine claims that ‘the Courts deferential stance has
substantially harmed the nation-and done so needlessly-by compromising individual liberty, the rule of law,
and the democratic process’” (633).23 The Supreme
Court has often decided on issues concerning individual liberties and commonly found that national security concerns rightly supersede privileges guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the most famous example
in illustrating this point is the notable case Schenck v.
U.S. (1919), in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. issued the unanimous majority opinion that freedom of speech is outweighed by national security
concerns expressed under the Espionage Act. Now a
colloquial phrase in case law, Justice Holmes inaugurated the “clear and present danger” test in determining whether speech could rightfully be limited. In this
case, and in others relating to civil liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has a history
of occasionally permitting executive national security actions which appear contradictory to the Bill of
Rights.
Since the beginning of the War on Terrorism,
following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., national security has been a primary concern of most Americans. The administrations of
Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald J. Trump have used the prevalence of fear in citizen’s minds to expand their powers in fighting the War
on Terror. Congress authorized unilateral presidential

action in the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against perpetrators of the attacks
and associated groups. The vague language enabled
the president to use military force almost anywhere in
the world, so long as there was a loose connection to
terrorist organizations. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court allowed President Bush to detain individuals related to the terrorist attacks, including American
citizens. Congress’ authorization contributed significant legitimacy to presidential actions since 2001.
Judicial deference to expanding presidential
power is nothing new in the modern era, Douglas
argues, as he found that “state secrets claims failed
in only 4 out of 58 reported cases in the period 19772005.”24 In other words, the argument that state secrets
are at risk, and therefore a matter beyond the courts’
jurisdiction, has largely been successful in modern
courtrooms. In 1971, SCOTUS ruled for the first time
in the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents that
those deprived of constitutional liberties are subject
to remedy by the government and such victims have
standing to sue before the court. Since the Bivens
doctrine was conceived, the Court has only weakened
its effectiveness through the creation of what Zbrokek
calls the “national security exemption.”25 In federal
court cases which never reached the Supreme Court,
known as Aulaqi I and Aulaqi II, judges ruled that the
family of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, who was
killed by drone strikes ordered by President Obama,
lacked standing to sue and dismissed the case. Plaintiffs argued that al-Awlaki was deprived of life and
liberty without constitutional due process and that his
estate was subject to remedy according to the Bivens
doctrine. This is the most recent, yet most extreme,
example of the national security exemption. Zbrokek
claims that, “By foreclosing Bivens actions to victims of government action, the courts have potentially
deprived American citizens of constitutional protections and crafted an expansive exemption for national
security-related suits.”26 The national security exemption is significant not only in conversations of affording remedies to victims of government action, viewed

22 Blomquist.
23 Gregory S. McNeal, “Deference, Power, and Emerging Security Threats.” Texas Law Review 95, no. 3 (2017): 631-650. Academic Search
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 19, 2018).
24 Douglas, 112.
25 Alexander Steven Zbrokek, “Square Pegs and Round Holes: Moving Beyond Bivens in National Security Cases.” Columbia Journal of Law &
Social Problems 47, no. 4 (2014): 485-524.
26 Ibid.
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by John Marshall to be essential to the enforcement of
constitutional guarantees, but also in simply deciding
when or whether government action supersedes civil
liberties.
Preventing an ‘Imperial Presidency’
Responding to weighty evidence suggesting noteworthy judicial acquiescence of authority to presidential sovereignty in external relations, a growing
number of American scholars, politicians, and ideological groups have offered actions to rein in presidential
power. One such method in preventing the further rise
of the “imperial presidency,” a term popularized by
presidential historian Arthur Schlesinger, is a reliance
on Congress to mandate statutory limits on executive
power. The analysis of the extent to which Congress
has deferred and enabled the rise of an imperial presidency is a matter for individual analysis. As this paper
has demonstrated, however, Congress has an important
role in legitimizing presidential power when it comes
to judicial interpretation. Likewise, a potential method
for reform, identified by Gregory McNeal, is for Congress to “create processes and procedures that bind
courts and the Executive. Congress can force structure
around doctrine and can even force a conversation
about what deference doctrines are constitutionally
mandated.”27 Considering the Legislative Branch has
blissfully delegated its power to the Executive Branch
in the past, it seems unlikely for any such congressional reform to be implemented.
Focusing on the development of the national
security exemption in relation to civil liberties and
constitutional guarantees, Alexander Zbrokek offers
his prescribed proper judicial reform relating to the
Bivens doctrine (described as inherently inadequate).
Therefore, he advocates for the creation of an “Article I court with jurisdiction over post-deprivation
constitutional claims in national security cases.”28
Would such a court be sufficient in increasing judicial
assertiveness overall, or would the statutory scope be
so narrow as to inadequately address the larger issue?
While the court would “close the rights/remedies gap
generated by the national security exception to the
Bivens doctrine and compel the Government to account for its actions,” it is unlikely that the growth in
the authority of the Executive Branch would be sig27
28
29
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McNeal, 637
Zbrokek.
Baker, In the Common Defense, 307.

nificantly impacted.
Seeking institutional checks and balances to
the growing system of presidential unilateralism on
national security matters will likely prove
ineffective. As is evidenced by the founding documents and writings of even the staunchest advocates
of executive power, checks and balances are central to
a functioning American government. In other words,
it was expected that the power of the presidency was
properly balanced by shared powers between the other
two branches of the federal government as well as the
states. It appears that, over time, institutional checks
are meaningless if the values of the American people
change. As has perhaps happened already, “assertions
of presidential authority made in extremis may become
embedded in U.S. practice and law without a corresponding application of checks and balances.” This
“may in time diminish both the principles of law that
define American life as well as the physical security
at which they are directed.”29 Therefore, James Baker
prescribes a “sustained commitment to the rule of law
in practice and perception” as the proper response to
dynamic and multifaceted threats to American national security. Only through an increased understanding
of founding legal principles and constitutional law
can existing institutional checks and balances begin
significantly limiting presidential power in external
relations.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to examine existing
scholarly literature and debate surrounding the question of executive authority in national security policymaking, and to subsequently determine whether
the Supreme Court has historically enabled or limited presidential power. The hypothesis proposed the
existence of considerable evidence would indicate that
the Supreme Court has limited the president through
judicial review. After careful review of case law and
opinions from national security legal experts, it appears that the original hypothesis is null. Through lack
of action in the face of executive power-grabs (due to
SCOTUS’s nature as a reactionary force), the courts
have enabled an expanding definition of presidential
war powers. While courts have occasionally limited

powers of the president, these limits occur in very specific circumstances and tend to reinforce Blomquist’s
idea of “reasonably deferential judicial review.”

Supreme Court actions can be organized into
the following framework to explain the historical variation in levels of deference. First mentioned during
the conversation surrounding Korematsu, but recurrent
throughout this paper, is the idea that Congress lending legitimacy to presidential action cannot be underscored. Christenson, however, discusses the influence
of public opinion on presidential action. He further
demonstrates how a Supreme Court case surrounding
the action influences public opinion, the outcome of
the case, and the future actions of the president.
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Therefore, the above flowchart helps to explain
what considerations matter most in the outcome of
national security cases before the Court. It should be
noted that these outcomes are only likely according
to this research and could change given the personal
opinions or ideologies of the particular individuals on
the Supreme Court. A good example to illustrate this
flowchart is the aforementioned Ex Parte Merryman
case in which a federal district court ruled against
President Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus.
Lincoln did not have approval from Congress to exercise their constitutional responsibility and uproar arose
from the American people who were already inclined
to call the President a tyrant. Such conditions being
met, the court, chaired by Chief Justice Roger Taney,
ruled against Lincoln. Lincoln, however, simply ignored the decision and carried on.
The ascendancy of the president in national
security policy is the greatest change in American
government. Shifting perception of the proper role of
the presidency paired with the changing threats facing
the United States has led to the primacy of the Executive Branch. Traditionally, public opinion, Congress,
and the Courts are most readily equipped to check
wrongful assertions of executive power. Resulting
from a greater degree of deferral from the public and
Congress, however, has been a general trend towards
judicial deference. Although the Supreme Court has
decided against presidential powers in individual
examples, the legal precedents set by Youngstown and
Curtiss-Wright have worked what Blomquist calls
‘presiprudence’ into accepted legal doctrine. Going
forward, the Supreme Court is likely to continue in
this tradition, given an increased and ill-defined threat
from non-state actors, terrorist organizations, significant power tensions, and nuclear weapons.
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